Faith and the Edifying Life
From a Pragmatist’s Point of
View
–A Critical Perspective
Nader N. Chokr
Professor of Philosophy & Social
Sciences
Prelude
"We
and God have business with each other, and in opening ourselves to his
influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled" (William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience,
1905: 516).
"Grant
an idea or belief to be true, what concrete difference will its being true make
in anyone's actual life?" (William James, The Will to Believe, 1897).
1. Introduction
Very few of us today believe in God because of rational proofs that
philosophers typically trade in. Many people, perhaps most, do not need any
rational proof for their religious belief, any more than they need proof that
they feel joyful or loving. Others might point out innumerable reasons for not
feeling joyful or loving, but to those experiencing these feelings, such
arguments mean nothing, they do not even resonate, because they have directly
experienced the feelings. Similarly, many people who believe in God do so, they
claim, because they have experienced “an unseen reality,” and they feel that
this unseen reality is deeper and more real than any of their sense
experiences. For many people, these religious experiences are simply quiet
moments in which they have “felt” a “divine presence,” and this calm feeling is
strong enough to convince them that God exists. Others claim to have had
extraordinary, ineffable “ecstatic” or “mystical” experiences coupled with
dramatic insights and intense religious feelings. What are we to make of such
claims?
In The Varieties of Religious
Experience (1902/1987), arguably his most influential and popular work,
William James raises indeed the question “Is the sense of divine presence a
sense of anything objectively true?” He answers it in a way that is most
thought-provoking, consistently with his pragmatic philosophy. This is a
question, which has long been debated by philosophers and theologians alike.
Phrased differently, it comes down to this: “Is there any (objective) evidence
for believing in a divine presence?” Or alternatively, “Can God’s existence be
established, proven using rational, logical modes of reasoning and empirical
procedures of verification, as exemplified in the sciences?” James’ short
answer is that we can neither prove nor disprove God’s existence. But this does
not and should not prevent us from believing in God’s existence. While the
question of God’s existence is inconclusive on logical and rational grounds,
the question of belief in a divine dimension --whether in the form of theism, deism, pantheism, or polytheism-- is not.1 Religious belief does not have to be based on
evidence; it is a personal decision made from the heart. You can decide based
on your own experiences whether to believe, and your decision, if you are true
to it, will affect your life, because through it you relate yourself to the
world and everything in it. In other words, when a question cannot be answered
on intellectual grounds, James argues, then we not only can but should allow
our ‘passional’ nature to decide it. Our “will (right) to believe” should be
overriding, based on our personal (ordinary or extraordinary) experiences of a
divine presence. In a sense, as in Pascal’s Wager, James argues that we stand
to gain everything if He actually exists, and lose nothing if He does not. So,
why not make the bet, and believe that He truly exists? It is a reasonable and
even rational bet, one which is furthermore “edifying” in the moral and
spiritual sense.
While James believed in a judicious and appropriate use of logic
and science, for those things and phenomena (matters of fact) which can be more or less decided by appeal to
objective evidence, his goal was to free us from enslavement to the rather
pervasive notion the we must believe whatever logic and science assert,
regardless of the consequences to our moral and spiritual health and general
well-being. Instead, James argued that science should be evaluated in terms of
the extent to which scientific beliefs are conducive to human happiness –a
thought certainly worth pondering anew in an age of extreme scientism.
Accordingly, if belief in scientific determinism and materialistic reductionism
are inimical to human happiness and well being, then disbelief is necessary for
psychic survival and vitality. He writes:
Now I wish to make you feel, if I can, that we have a right
to believe the physical order to be only a partial order; that we have a right
to supplement it by an unseen spiritual order which we assume on trust, if only
thereby life may seem to us better worth living again. But such a trust will
seem to some of you sadly mystical and execrably unscientific. In this very
University, I have heard more than one teacher say that all the fundamental
conceptions of truth have already been found by science, and that the future
has only the details of the picture to fill in. But the slightest reflections
on the real conditions will suffice to show how barbaric such notions are? No! Our science is but a drop, our ignorance a
sea. Whatever else be certain, this at least is certain --that the world of
our present natural knowledge is enveloped in a larger world of some sort of
whose residual properties we at present can frame no positive idea (James, 1895/1962:
53; italics added).
So, if by “objectively true,” one means “true by virtue of
satisfying the empirical and scientific procedures of verification,” then James’
answer to the question would be ‘No’. But for James, science does not cover or
exhaust the realm of all that is important and meaningful to us. Nor does it
provide the ultimate yardstick by which all ‘truths’ are or should be measured.
While there is a place and role for science, its methods and procedures --and
James, as an empiricist, certainly wishes to countenance such a (pluralistic)
view-- he does not believe however that we ought to subordinate all human
endeavors and concerns to its hegemony and pervasiveness. Furthermore, the
concept of truth found in the empirical sciences does not seem to be adequate
enough for James’ purposes as a pragmatic philosopher. So, he redefines the
concept of truth in accord with the precepts and tenets of pragmatism.2 ‘Objective truth’ is not,
in James’ view the chief value. Usefulness is, but usefulness in the moral and
spiritual sense of producing healthy results. In this sense, it is better to
have a necessary and vital lie than a destructive and unnecessary truth.
It is reported, for example, that in testimony before the
Massachusetts Legislature, James spoke against a bill that would have
prohibited Christian Scientists from practicing what were then called “mind
cures.” “You are not to ask yourselves, James told the legislators, whether
these mind-curers really achieve the successes that are claimed. It is enough,
stated, for you legislators to ascertain that a large number of your citizens are
persuaded that a valuable new department of medical experience is by them
opening up” (Tymoczko, 1996: 100). It should be stressed from the start that
James does place matters of faith
(moral and spiritual matters) in contrast, though not in opposition, to what
can be decided by appeal to objective evidence (matters of fact). But he asserts our right to believe, to believe
in the line of our needs, our will to believe whatever is necessary for us, to
entertain a religious faith, faith in God (or Gods), even conversion to a
religious way of life, and other forms of “ultra-marginal life.” And he regards
this kind of belief as something that can and does make a practical and real
difference in people’s lives, and that is, therefore, as ‘real’ and as ‘truthful’
as anything ‘objectively true’, perhaps even in a more robust sense, at least
on James’ pragmatic grounds.
In order however to better appreciate his answer and evaluate it,
it is important to have some understanding of James’ pragmatism (its method,
conception of truth, and goals); it is important to ascertain further his
stance against traditional philosophy, science, scientific materialism,
objective truth, and get a clearer sense of the fundamental precepts of his ‘pragmatic
religion,’ i.e., his discussions of the “will (or right) to believe,” the power
and truth of religious ideas and beliefs, the merits of a religious or “ultra-marginal
life,” of saintliness and even mysticism.
In the present essay, I attempt to capture James’ compelling case
for the common sense view of religious belief on pragmatic grounds. In the
process, I show that he articulates a vibrant, vital, and heroic philosophy of
redemption and salvation, or as he calls it, a philosophy of the “strenuous
mood.” It is in effect a kind of “philosophical religion” which has much appeal
in that it provides ideals and values worth striving for, and could satisfy our
need and right to believe without appealing to metaphysical abstractions and
rational proofs. After careful analysis of his views and positions, I argue however
that his pragmatic defense of religious faith is ultimately inadequate.
2. Pragmatism vs. Traditional Philosophy
William James was arguably the most original and influential
advocate of pragmatism --an empirically based philosophy that defines knowledge
and truth in terms of practical consequences. He believed that philosophy must
be more than a mere intellectual enterprise, and that its true purpose is to
help us live by showing us how to discover and adopt beliefs that fit our
individual needs and temperaments. He thus sought to shift the focus of inquiry
from the search for objectively true absolute beliefs to the search for beliefs
that work for us. For this and other reasons, his philosophy has been
characterized variously as provocative, enthusiastic, optimistic, and vigorous.
It speaks to the nearly universal yearning and need for ideas and truths that
matter to individuals. Voicing the lament of the common person “What difference
does this or that philosophy make to my life?” James offers an uncommonly rich
answer to many of the questions which have traditionally puzzled and confounded
philosophers and laypersons alike --including as we shall see shortly the
question here of concern. In so doing, James reflected a growing trend among
philosophers of the time to resist the abstract, demand relevance and immediacy,
and deal with “the living issues” that face us. In James’ view, “The whole
function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will
make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or
that world-formula be the true one.”
There is in this statement as often in James’ writings a strong
implicit moral overtone: It is not enough for philosophers to tackle questions
of consistency or spin out grand theories. People are struggling through their
lives, suffering, rejoicing, searching, and dying. We have a right, indeed an
obligation, to ask: “What difference does the theory of Forms (Plato’s), for
example, make to me, now?” How is my life different if, as
The pragmatic method, he writes, is primarily a method of
settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise would be interminable. A
pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once and for all upon a lot of
inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away from
abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles,
closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns toward
concreteness and adequacy, toward facts, toward action and toward power (James,
1897/1956: 146-7).
Thus, James saw pragmatism as a method, and not as a collection of
beliefs. It consists primarily in asking its usual question: “Grant an idea or
belief to be true, it says, what concrete difference will its being true make
in anyone’s actual life?” In other words, how will its ‘truth’ be realized?
What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief
were false? What, in short, is the truth’s cash value in experiential terms?
According to James, the moment pragmatism asks this question, the answer
emerges:
True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate,
corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. That is the
practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the
meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known as ‘Our account of truth,
he adds, is an account of truths in the plural, of processes.’ Truth for us is
simply a collective name for verification-processes (1907/1987: 573ff).4
Thus, James saw a use for various theories of verification and
meaning so long as they are ultimately used to determine the practical payoff
or cash value of ideas and beliefs. In some instances, we may benefit from
using both empirical and rational criteria --say, for example, concerning factual
matters. But with regards to moral and spiritual matters, James would argue, we
are better off resorting to, and relying on, pragmatic criteria.
3. The Will and/or Right to
Believe: Toward a Pragmatic Philosophical Religion
For James, our lives are shaped by our beliefs. And we need to
believe more than we can ever prove by overly strict, objective, neutral
standards, which he calls “agnostic rules for truth-seeking.” He says, “If one
should assume that pure reason is what settles our opinions, he would fly in
the teeth of facts.” What then does settle our opinions? James answers: the
will to believe. And what we believe is a function of our temperament (i.e.,
tough- or soft-minded, or a mixture thereof): pessimistic, irreligious,
materialist, empiricist, determinist, skeptical vs. optimistic, religious,
idealistic, rationalist, free-willist, dogmatic, etc). As we have seen earlier,
the function of philosophy for James is no longer to reveal the truth about the world but instead to learn how to live in the world. We
live our lives according to beliefs that are products of our temperaments and
experience; they are not, James argues, the products of abstract philosophical
reasoning; rather, we manage to find reasons to believe what we want and need to
believe. And we have the right to do that. The
Will to Believe (1897/1956), as he later said, should have been titled The
Right to Believe.
In psychological terms, pragmatic philosophy is meant to provide a
way of becoming better adjusted to the world. “Living at home in the universe”
does not, at least according to James, depend on knowing and believing what is
true, but on believing things that suit us. The issue then is how to find a
cause (for a heroic and perhaps even an “ultra-marginal life”),5 how to find beliefs worth
living for, worth fighting and dying for --in other words, how to find a “philosophical
religion.” Because life demands a response, demands action, we have no choice
but to believe something. Life presents us with what James calls forced options. We must make decisions
as to whether we want to or not (even ‘not deciding’ is a decision). We cannot
remain detached and disinterested; life simply does not allow it. We are
compelled to decide and to act, and reason is not a sufficient force for
action. We do not act on what we understand, but on what we believe. The
rationalist’s and skeptic’s demands for certainty cannot be met, yet we
continue to live and act --without intellectual certainty. To the patience
required for the search of the concept of ‘certainty’ or ‘objectivity,’ we must
oppose the urgency of action, and therefore belief.
I, therefore, for one cannot see my way to accept the
agnostic rules of truth-seeking, or willfully agree to keep my willing nature
out of the game. I cannot do so for the plain reason that a rule of thinking
which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truths if
those kinds of truths were really there would be an irrational rule. If we had
an infallible intellect with its objective certitudes, we might feel ourselves
disloyal to such a perfect organ of knowledge in not trusting to it
exclusively. But if we are empiricists, if we believe that no bell in us tolls
to let us know for certain when truth is in our grasp, then it seems a piece of
idle fantasticality to preach so solemnly our duty of waiting for the bell.
Indeed, we may wait if we will --I hope you do not think I am denying that--
(we ought, on the contrary, delicately and profoundly to respect one another’s
mental freedom) but if we do wait, we do so at our own peril as much as if we
believed (James, 1897/1956: 28, 30).
For James, the intellect does not discover the truths in which we
believe; the will creates truth. Rejecting the traditional conception of truth
(held by both rationalists and empiricists) according to which it is said to be
objective (true for all rational beings), universal (true at all times, in all
languages, for all creeds, for all ages, races, and genders, in all conditions)
and therefore, context-less, James argues that experience makes it clear that
ideas become true. Elsewhere, he says rather provocatively: “Truth happens to
an idea.” In other words, we decide whether or not an idea is true by testing
it, as Charles Peirce, the father of pragmatism, pointed out, or in James’ terminology,
by determining whether it is an “idea upon which we can ride,” so to speak. For
James, "[A]ny idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of
our experience to any other, linking things satisfactorily, working securely,
simplifying, saving labor, is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true
instrumentally" (1907/1987: 58).
Ideas and beliefs are tested against our past experiences and
accepted or rejected based on how well they accord with them, how well they
work for us. A common tendency may be to resist or reject new ideas and
beliefs, and to hold on for as long as possible to most of our current ideas
and beliefs. “The most violent revolutions in an individual’s beliefs leave
most of his old order standing” (1907/1987: 64). However, the “community-wide
aspect of truth-seeking” forces us every now and then to test and re-evaluate
them, keeping some and discarding others as we and the world change. We have
all witnessed this process. It is especially clear in the areas of moral and
religious belief --areas that James thought to be vital to human happiness and
well-being, his one overriding concern. For example, looking back over history,
we see that ideas about vice have changed. Few contemporary Americans believe
it is wrong for women to appear in public with bare ankles, but many people
used to. Even Churches regularly convene councils to modify basic articles of
faith, and entirely new religions emerge when old ones no longer pay. So, for
James, there is no such thing as disinterested truth. Pragmatic truth is human
truth, personal and subjective. “Purely objective truth, James asserts, plays
no role whatsoever, is nowhere to be found.” Useful, human truth is alive.
Truth grows, whereas rationalistic abstract, dogmatic truth is “the dead heart
of the living tree.” In this context, it should be noted that James had a deep
and profound respect for a religion that enriches our lives, one that has “cash
value.” He noted that people in all cultures turn to a God who gets things
done, an active God, a God of the “strenuous mood,” not as a passive,
ineffective god. This led James to an intriguing suggestion: If people do not
believe in God, it may be because God is no longer doing anything in their
lives.6
4. On Religion, God, and
Faith.
In The Varieties of Religious
Experience, James attempts to discover how God -or divine presence- works
in people’s lives. Combining an empirical, psychological study of a number of
cases with a keen philosophical analysis, he attempts to account for the
antecedents, the value and significance of religion. The question of how it
came to be what it is, is a matter of classifying religious feelings and
religious propensities with other kinds of human experience which are found to
be similar.
For James, nothing said about the history or genesis of religious
phenomena (feelings, propensities, ideas, beliefs, rites and rituals, etc) can
shed the slightest light on the spiritual worth and significance of these
phenomena. The “older dogmatists” attempted to justify religion once and for
all by pointing to its privileged origin in some kind of revelation. “Newer
dogmatists” --the so-called “medical materialists” --attempted to discredit
religion once and for all by pointing to its disreputable origin in some
curious bodily state. Neither approach is acceptable to James. Religion must be
judged the same way that everything else is judged, by proving itself useful in
specifiable ways. Religion must in other words “run the gauntlet of
confrontation with the total context of experience” (1902/1987: 426). This
context includes the collection of all our established truths as well as the
exigencies of our affective and intellectual natures. Therefore, the defense of
religion that is found in James is not based, as some think, on appeals to
either mere social utility or purely subjective feeling. In James’ view, we
ultimately judge the truth of religious ideas by what he calls their “immediate
luminousness,” adding “in short, philosophical reasonableness and moral
helpfulness are the only available criteria.” He concludes that religious faith
is important and meaningful on pragmatic grounds: its presence or absence makes
a clearly observable, practical and concrete difference in our lives.
His own religious belief consists in the affirmation that the world
is richer in realities than conventional science is willing (and capable) to
recognize. Religious experience at least suggests that there is what James
calls “a higher part of the universe” which, though beyond the immediate
deliverance of the senses, is nevertheless effective in the world in a way that
makes a noticeable difference.
The practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me
sufficiently met by the belief that beyond Man and in a fashion continuous with
him, there exists a larger power which is friendly to him and his ideals. All
that the facts require is that the power shall be other and larger than our
conscious selves. God is the natural appellation, for us Christians at least,
for the supreme reality, so I will call this higher part of the universe by the
name of God. We and God have business
with each other; and in opening ourselves to his influence our deepest
destiny is fulfilled" (1902/1987: 525, 516-7; italics added).
Thus, James thought that a religious orientation is more effective
than a non-religious one because it encompasses more. It addresses and derives
from a wider range of experiences, including a wider, more expansive
consciousness than a purely secular point of view. Besides the obvious
psychological benefits of having God as support and comfort, religious
conversion can open us up and make us more responsive to all of life.
5. James’ Pragmatic Defense
of Religious Faith
Let us turn now in greater details to James’ defense of faith and
religious conversion. He does not hold that it is demonstrable either that God
exists or that God has a nature. Rightly or wrongly, he does place however, as
I pointed out above, matters of faith (moral and spiritual matters) in
contrast, though not in opposition, to what can be decided by appeal to
objective evidence, i.e., matters of facts.7
James develops “a defense of our right to adopt a believing attitude in
religious matters in spite of the fact our merely logical intellect may not
have been coerced” (1897/1956: 2). The defense requires a series of
distinctions (between “live vs. dead,” “forced vs. avoidable,”
and “momentous vs. trivial” options) which, though not
precise, seem useful. For our present purposes, it shall suffice to say that a
hypothesis, namely, “anything that may be proposed to our belief” (1897/1956: 3),
is live if the one to whom it is
proposed takes it “as a real possibility.” Otherwise, for that person, it is dead. An option between two hypotheses
is live if both the hypotheses are live for the person who must choose. An
option is forced if the hypotheses
exhaust the alternatives of choice, and momentous
(as in a career move, for example), if it is important whether one hypothesis
is chosen as opposed to the other --in
terms of positive, beneficial, practical consequences. A genuine option is
therefore living, forced, and momentous.
Assuming that James’ distinctions are clear enough, his contention
is that in the case of some such (genuine) options the objective evidence we
possess gives us no rational basis for deciding one way rather than another. “Objective”
evidence is, roughly, evidence about matters other than how adopting a given
hypothesis or belief will affect the life of the one who adopts it. In such
cases, he maintains the following:
Our ‘passional’ nature not only lawfully may, but must,
decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that
cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such
circumstances, ‘Do not decide, but leave the question open,’ is itself a
passional decision --just like deciding yes or no- and is attended with the
same risk of losing the truth (1897/1956: 11).
Since, in the case of genuine options. The effects of choosing one
way rather than another are crucially important for the person choosing, in a
case in which evidence is absent or indecisive, it is only reasonable, says
James, to appeal to the consequences of making one choice as opposed to the other,
and to choose in the light of those consequences (1897/1956: 7).8 The risk of believing
something false is sometimes less fearsome than the risk of the consequences of
choosing not to believe at all. For example, if one agrees with Tolstoy that if
God does not exist, then life is meaningless and has no value, and if there is
no rational procedure for establishing the truth or falsity of “God exists,”
then a person who wishes his/her life to have some point (and who does not?)
may reasonably choose to believe that God does exist. “Reasonable” belief here
means reasonable in light of the consequences, not reasonable in light of the
objective evidence independent of the consequences.
An obvious objection to James’ contentions thus far must be
addressed before we can proceed. In short, the objection is that we cannot
decide to believe or not believe a statement, at least in most cases. I can
decide for example that the evidence that
In what follows, however, I will not press this objection further but
will rather interpret James, perhaps with some license, so as not to leave his
position open to this objection. Also, James does not have in mind simply “conscious
deliberative choices and actions.” “When
I say ‘willing nature,’ he writes, I do not mean only ‘deliberate volitions,’ I
mean all such factors of belief as fear and hope, prejudice, and passion” (1897/1956:
9). Nonetheless, he holds on to his defense of religious faith. To adopt a
belief in the case of choosing between genuine options is, he suggests,
tantamount to adopting a policy of action. It is to adopt a way of life, with
the consequent assumptions and ways of acting. In a crucial footnote, he writes:
Since belief is measured by action, he who forbids us to
believe religion to be true necessarily also forbids us to act as we should if
we did believe it to be true. The whole defense of religious faith hinges upon
action. If the action required or inspired by the religious hypothesis is in no
way different from that dictated by the naturalistic hypothesis, then religious
faith is a pure superfluity. I myself believe that the religious hypothesis
gives to the world an expression which specifically determines our reactions,
and makes them in a large part unlike what we might be on a purely naturalistic
scheme of belief (1897/1956: 29ff).
But we can choose to adopt ways of life, which includes adopting
beliefs and more besides. One obvious feature of James defense of faith is that
of the behavioral and attitudinal consequences of accepting theism (as opposed to deism) --i.e., the belief that there is
one God, separate from the world, yet its creator and ruler, perfect in every
way, worthy of worship, and concerned with human affairs (Hudson, 1991: 33).
They are different from those of rejecting it. Furthermore, at least for some
people, adopting theism has beneficial consequences. Whether this is, or would
be so generally, and whether one or another form of religious institution is
beneficial to a society, are not discussed by James. As cases in point however,
the description of the ‘blessed man’ who trusts in the Lord in Psalm One, or
the man whose shepherd is the Lord in Psalm Twenty-three, or St. Paul’s
expressions of gratitude toward God throughout the epistles provide relevant
indication that this is the case in the lives of at least some individuals. For
any such person, adopting a religious outlook or committing oneself to a
religious way of life is patently reasonable, given that the conditions of his
choice are those indicated: absence of determining evidence and presence of
beneficial consequences.
There is a further element in James’ defense that should not be
overlooked. He notes that, in some cases, what we desire to be true can be
brought about by our own efforts. This is what social scientists refer to as “the
self-fulfilling prophecy predicament.” Within somewhat restricted limits, the
claim that the desire for a certain kind of truth brings about that truth’s
existence is true. For example, a student who does poorly on an exam because he
expects to fail it, or a man who believes that his date will not like him and
who has his prophecy fulfilled. It is also said that he who courts a woman often
wins a wife, and a man who wishes to have friends must himself be friendly.
Generally speaking, a relation between two people, or a character trait in one
person, can often be elicited by the behavior of an individual who desires to
produce just that relationship or trait. But how does this apply to the case of
religious belief? It would be ridiculous indeed were James to suggest that we
could make the statement “God exists” true by anything that we did. His point
is rather that if a personal Deity exists, being aware that He does may be
possible just in case we act as if He did, or adopt a way of life with its
attendant beliefs and ways of acting. This might, of course, only produce the
illusion that He exists, i.e., create the belief that He does when the belief
is false. Or it might, so to speak, establish contact with a Deity who was
there all along. But if God’s existence cannot be demonstrated, perhaps
nonetheless, He can be experienced; if this is a possibility, there is no
cogent reason not to try it and see --i.e., not to adopt a religious way of
life, including accepting certain beliefs.
6. On the Varieties of
Religious Experiences
In his survey of religious experiences, James distinguished between
two basic types of personalities, the “healthy-minded” and the “morbid-minded”.
The former are positive in their
outlook, optimistic, vital, enthusiastic, exuberant and perhaps somewhat naive,
while the latter are negativistic, pessimistic, disillusioned, disabused, and perhaps
more realistic. They seem to see more of the world for what it truly is, i.e.,
nasty, brutish, and full of evil. According to James, morbid-minded people have
a clearer, more realistic perspective than healthy-minded ones because they
recognize a wider range of experiences.9
In order to better grasp his point, think of what it means to be always joyful
and enthusiastic in a world such as ours. This lopsided kind of “healthy-mindedness”
might result from a lack of true empathy with the condition of other people. A
shallow enough view of things can result in a childish (not childlike) view of
life in which nothing is really bad. Or, if it is bad, it is not that bad. Or,
if it is that bad, then it is somehow deserved.
In his analysis, James’ interest is to identify the most practical
spiritual balance. A soul that is blocked off from a major portion of
experience, which, for want of a better word, we may refer to simply as evil,
will be less effective, less ‘alive’ than one that is not. James believed in
the experience of being reborn --an idea which seems to have gained in
popularity in today’s New Age cultures and religions. According to him, such an
experience makes happiness possible in a complex, nasty and brutish world,
without resorting to the limited perspective of the healthy-minded. Rebirth in
James’ sense refers to a profound alteration of consciousness, and though this
change results in a ‘religious’ outlook, it is not confined to religion as
such. Rebirth offers a solution to the dilemma of achieving a morally decent measure
of happiness while acknowledging the pervasive presence of evil in the world.
To put it another way: Are healthy-minded ignorance or despondent
pessimism the only options? According to James, profound spiritual experience--a
third possibility-- can avoid the extremes of ignorance or pessimism. James
identified two kinds of conversion experience, ‘instantaneous’ conversion and a
slower, gradual process of conversion he labeled ‘natural.’ He claimed the
fruits of both kinds of conversion are comparable: an expansion of ordinary
consciousness. According to James, our “field of consciousness” is always in a
state of flux, with a changing border he called the “margin of consciousness.”
Arguing from a strictly psychological perspective, James concluded that
religious experience evokes responses from an “ultra-marginal life.” In
contemporary terms, genuine religious experience flows from and opens channels
to otherwise inaccessible realms of experience. He divided the fruits of
spiritual experience --the unmistakable signs of the ultra-marginal life-- into
two areas: conduct and thinking. The fruit of re-born conduct is saintliness, a way of life devoted
exclusively to a heightened religious consciousness; the fruit of re-born
thinking is mysticism, a way of
thinking that views everything in terms of a powerful religious experience.
According to James, all mystical experiences have two common characteristics:
the first is ineffability; that is, the state defies expression. The second is
a noetic quality; that is, to the
individual the experiences are insightful and sources of knowledge. They
provide insights into the human condition that no amount of intellectualizing
can plumb. In sum, mysticism is the experience of a reality that we can truly
know only when we surrender our individual selves and sense a union with the
divine ground of all existence, whereby one is all, and all is one.10
James proposed to “test saintliness by common sense, to use human
standards to help us decide how far the religious life commends itself as an
ideal of human activity.” He noted that some saints are fanatics and others
naïve. The fanatics are “masterful and aggressive,” whereas the naïve saints
are “a genuinely creative social force.” He reminded us that “the fruits of
religion are like all human products, liable to corruption by excess; common sense
must judge them” (1902/1987: 310). James is at his best when he describes the
naïve saint:
If things are ever to move upward, someone must be ready to
take the first step, and assume the risk of it. No one who is not willing to
try charity, to try non-resistance as the saint is willing, can tell whether
these methods will or will not succeed. When they do succeed, they are far more
powerfully successful than force or worldly prudence. Force destroys enemies;
and the best that can be said of prudence is that it keeps what we already have
in safety. But non-resistance, when successful, turns enemies into friends; and
charity regenerates its object. These saintly methods are, as I said, creative
energies; and genuine saints find in the elevated excitement with which their
faith endows them an authority and impressiveness which makes them irresistible
in situations where men of shallower nature cannot get on at all without the
use of worldly prudence. This practical proof that worldly wisdom may be safely transcended is the saint’s magic gift to humanity (James, 1902/1987:
325; italics added).
Those of us who have not experienced the “ultra-marginal life” have
only our practical wisdom to guide us. No wonder we are afraid to help the
dirty stranger at the door, afraid to let him into the house. He might hurt us,
soil the carpet, or steal something. Our fears are prudent. Despite the parable
of the Good Samaritan, it is not prudent to stop and help a stranded motorist,
it is smarter to call for help. It is prudent to defend ourselves.11 Like the saint, the
mystic has practical value, according to James. The mystic state is not
artificial in the sense of being phony or less real, but “unnatural” in the
sense of being rare and short-lived: “Except in rare instances, half an hour,
or at most an hour or two, seems to be the limit beyond which they fade in the
light of common day,” James said (ibid). Despite its practical value however,
there can be no conclusive proof that mystical experience is or is not an
insight into higher wisdom.
7. A Critical Evaluation of
James’ Defense
In closing, I will summarize James’ defense of faith, and finally
turn to its systematic evaluation. We have no decisive or even probable
evidence with respect to the claim that God exists. In some cases at least,
belief that He does exist produces beneficial consequences for the one who
adopts the belief. If a personal God exists, it is possible that only by worship,
meditation, or other aspects of a religious way of life, with acceptance of
attendant beliefs, can He be apprehended. To refuse to risk error, and hence to
refuse to seek that apprehension, would be the reverse of rational. Given that
the evidence relevant to religious belief is absent or indecisive, and that the
adoption or not of such belief is a genuine option, belief is more rational
than disbelief.
Recall here the statement that James made earlier: “the rule of
thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of
truths if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule”
(1897/1956: 28). We can, in James’ view, reject any such rule in light of the
foregoing considerations. Indeed, in rejecting such a rule we are faithful to a
more fundamental rule of right thinking. "We must know the truth, and we
must avoid error --these are our first and great commandments as “would-be
knowers”; but they are not two ways of stating an identical commandment, they
are two separable laws" (1897/1956: 28). Indeed, James suggests, they are
so importantly different that “by choosing between them we may end up by
coloring differently our whole intellectual life. We may regard the pursuit of
truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may, on the
other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take
its chance” (1897/1956: 18). And he emphatically establishes the first priority
for himself. James was less worried about being ‘duped’ by a false belief than
he was about being unhappy. When we are more committed to avoiding error than
to pursuing the truth, he argues, we necessarily lose the truth, since we will
never be able to find absolute supporting evidence ?except for the fact that
consciousness exists. Where the force of evidence is clear, then no conflict
between the rules arises. It should also be noted that “the freedom to believe
can cover living options which the intellect of the individual cannot by itself
resolve” (1897/1956: 29). But, as we have seen, where an option is genuine and
evidence absent or indecisive, the rules do conflict and establishing one
priority over another becomes itself a genuine option for which no decisive or
compelling objective evidence is available. James’ case for religious faith is,
in effect, equally a defense of the priority of the rule “We must know the
truth” over the rule “We must avoid error.”
In this sense, James’ defense is a defense of faith --against the
claim that faith is unreasonable since it involves holding statements to be
true with far more tenacity than the evidence allows. Even if it is true that,
at least for some, religious belief has good consequences, surely no one could
in fact accept it simply for that reason and yet profess any allegiance to the
rules of reason that James articulates. If adopting a religious belief was
merely a matter of choosing to act in a specified manner, the defense might
well be sufficient. But we know the implausibility of that view, at least for
beliefs central to the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. Since, at least in
some cases, religious belief involves the acceptance of substantive claims (a
view that James accepts), what would accepting these claims on the basis of
personal benefit amount to? He offers “the best things are the eternal things”
and “we are better off even now if we believe” this, as the basic religious
beliefs. Though these affirmations are vague, they are also substantive. One
may further argue that spiritual efficacy or capacity to promote pious and
moral life is one thing; reality of the object figuring in efficacious
doctrines is another. It is in asserting the reality of such objects that faith
essentially consists; not in appreciating the value of statements concerning them
while their ontological status is left as an indifferent thing. This raises the
fundamental pragmatic paradox:
pragmatism works only if we believe our ideas and beliefs are true according to
non-pragmatic criteria. For example, can I really be reborn? If I believe there
is no more evidence for than against the existence of a benevolent God. Can I
really just say to myself: “Well, belief in God makes people feel secure and
gives meaning to their life. I would like to feel secure and find a purpose for
my life. Therefore, I shall believe in God.” Does not such belief work only
when I sincerely believe it to be true --really and factually true, not just
because I believe it is true?
Paradoxically, it seems as if only by believing in a non-pragmatic
view of truth can pragmatism work. No account of religious belief which makes
it an “as if” faith can be adequate.
It simply would not capture the fact that such belief involves accepting
substantive assertions confidently as true. Further, while one might recommend
religious faith to others on the ground that it had beneficial consequences,
this would not be tantamount to claiming that it was true. Nor could a follower
of James recommend it to himself on these grounds, for if the only thing that
makes faith reasonable is the consequences of adopting it, it is reasonable
only in the sense of being ‘prudential.’ But the rule “We should seek the truth”
would not then apply, since it is quite distinct from the rule, which James
does not discuss, namely, “we should be prudential.” Practices, not theses, can
be defended on prudential grounds.
If religious belief can be commended only as a “cosmic aspirin,” no
priority of one of James’ rules over another will make its adoption more
rational or reasonable than its rejection. In short, believing that if one
accepts a statement S one will reap beneficial consequences is not the same as
believing S, or showing that in believing S one will be seeking the truth. One
might, of course, claim that whatever was beneficial was also true. (This might
be a way of restating that “the best things are eternal”). But that would be to
have already made a choice with respect to another genuine option, and thus to
raise the question of the rationality of one or another choice with regard to
that option. The element of James’ defense, however, which he chooses to
emphasize is that if a personal God exists, it is plausible to believe that
only by a commitment on our part can He be known; only by our anticipating, so
to speak, a divine step in our direction can we ever hope to respond to a
divine overture if such there be. Only by making the response can we tell, if
at all, whether there are indeed any divine overtures. This would be James’ way
of saying “Taste and see that the Lord is good.” That something like this is
his intent is suggested when he comments in The
Will to Believe: “It matters not to an empiricist from what quarter a
hypothesis may come to him, if the total drift of thinking continues to confirm
it, that is what he means by its being true (1897/1956: 17).
If James’ arguments were intended to prove that a religious
position is the correct one, many questions would arise. Which religious
position should one adopt among the many incompatible ones available? Does
religious experience provide relevant evidence for religious claims? But James’
intent was only to show that religious faith of a very general sort is not
irrational. More specifically, to adopt a set of beliefs regarding which no
adequate evidence, pro or con, is available and whose adoption or
not is a genuine option, is not irrational. In the case of religious belief, in
fact, it is the rational option to believe. But does James even prove this
mitigated claim?
His defense in part rests on the claim that there is an important
difference between an attempt to verify the statement (a) “God exists” and that
of verifying (b) “Bodies expand upon friction.” The former hypothesis, it is
suggested, can be verified only if God, if he exists, reveals Himself, which He
will (ex hypothesis) do only to those
who, without evidence, accept the thesis that He does. The latter can be tested
by anyone with the requisite talent and materials, whether he is initially
inclined to accept or reject the claim, or has no initial view whatsoever about
its truth. One would have to justify the assumptions involved in the claim that
there is indeed this difference between the two hypotheses. How can one be so
confident about what God will or will not do?
But let us grant James this distinction. His proposal then is that
verification in religion can only temporally follow religious belief. Even if
this is so, the hypotheses will otherwise be substantially similar. Evidence,
pro or con, relevant to the claim (a) that “God exists” will either be forthcoming
or not. If so, then the evidence will decide the matter, with certainty or
probability, and the option will no longer be genuine. If not, then this
portion of James’ defense will have run its tether and the whole weight of his
argument will rest upon the issue of consequences again. I have earlier offered
some reasons for thinking that an argument resting on this issue will not serve
James’ purpose. Hence, in the end, his defense is patently inadequate.12
NOTES
1. For useful definitions of these terms, see
2. Much, as we shall see, depends on James’ account of truth, which
is by the way open to serious objections and criticisms. For example, one may
argue that James’ position seems to contradict itself, much as strict
relativism contradicts itself: He asserts the truth of his theory, which in
turn seems to deny the possibility of “a truth.” In response, James would argue
that he is not making a philosophical argument, but rather simply making a
broad case for a creed as an advocate. And so, he cannot presumably be held
accountable to the traditional philosophical standards and requirements (see “Pragmatism’s
Conception of Truth” in 1907/1987).
3. Interestingly enough, pragmatism and empiricist positivism (of
the
4. The following objection can be made against James’ account of
truth. By tying truth to “what works for us,” James cuts himself off from any
possibility of objective verification. Yet, most philosophers still hold that
the truth must refer to something beyond and not entirely determined by the
individual. James seems to blur the distinction between “truth” and “how we
discover it.” While we do test ideas by acting on them and by comparing them
with our more established beliefs, their truth is independent of this process.
Penicillin remains an effective antibiotic whether or not I believe that it is.
In response, James would point out that if we are concerned with factual
matters, then, yes, this criticism of pragmatism is valid. But since his
primary interest is with moral and spiritual matters, his account deserves our
attention, for pragmatism may well have something important to tell us. I will
say more later on the central distinction between factual matters (or matters of fact) and moral/spiritual
matters (or matters of faith).
5. James believed that life without heroic struggle is dull,
mediocre, and empty. Struggle, effort, and the “strenuous mood” are viewed as
vital elements of the good life. He was talking about a “real fight” for
something important, about the struggle between good and evil, in which one takes
risks, face dangers as well as excitement and passion. “If this life, he
writes, be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the
universe by success, it is no better than a game of theatricals from which we
may withdraw at will. But it feels like a real fight --as if there were
something really wild in the universe which we, with all our idealities and
faithfulnesses, are needed to redeem: and first of all to redeem our own hearts
from atheisms and fears. For such is a half-wild, half-saved universe adapted.
The deepest thing in our nature is ‘this dumb region of the heart,’ in which we
dwell alone with our willingness and unwillingness, our faiths and fears”
(1895/1962: 61).
6. Twenty years ago, during an extended stay in
7. Moral realists may object that the distinction that James draws or
assumes here is questionable; it is unclear whether it can be drawn
meaningfully. For my present purposes however, and for the sake of argument, I shall
grant James the distinction.
8. James’ case is even stronger if one adopts his account of truth,
but it does not depend on that account.
9. In recent decades, empirical studies of beliefs and
belief-formation have been interpreted as supporting James’ sense that the ‘best’
beliefs are not always the ‘truest’ ones. Thus, for example, according to Lyn
Abramson and Lauren Alloy (1979, 1988), “normal, healthy” people are subject to
a variety of “cognitive illusions.” Among these are mild, factually unwarranted
optimism and insensitivity to failure. Combined, these two “illusions” result
in tendencies to make “straightforwardly false” judgments. Ironically, because
they often do not suffer from such illusions, clinically depressed individuals
are “sadder, but wiser,” to use the
subtitle of one of Abramson and Alloy’s better known papers. In other research
in social psychology, Shelley Taylor (1988, 1989) found that victims of trauma
and illness who are “unjustifiably optimistic” tend to be better adjusted and
happier than more “realistic” victims of similar circumstances. Lastly, Daniel
Goleman (1985) is one of a number of neo-Freudians who has argued that
forgetting unpleasant events (repression) is an important component of mental
health (cited in Tymoczko, 1996: 99-100). This is clearly reminiscent of
Nietzsche’s statement that “forgetting is healthy.”
10. In the Varieties of
Religious Experience, James describes R. M. Bucke’s mystical experience as
follows: “All at once, without warning of any kind, I found myself in a
flame-colored cloud. For an instant I thought of fire, the next, I knew that
the fire was within myself. Directly afterward there came upon me a sense of
exultation, of immense joyousness accompanied or immediately followed by an
intellectual illumination impossible to describe. Among other things, I did not
merely come to believe, but I saw that the universe is not composed of dead
matter, but is, on the contrary, a living
Presence; I became conscious in myself of eternal life --I saw that all men are immortal: that the cosmic
order is such that without any pre-adventure all things work together for the
good of each and all; that the foundation principle of the world is what we
call love, and that the happiness of
each and all is in the long run absolutely certain” (1902/1987: 390-1; italics
added).
11. In this sense, we might say that Gandhi, Martin Luther King,
and Mother Teresa were not prudent. Though they were not saints, some might say
that their lives reflected some measure of the saint’s magic gift.
12. To say this does not of course establish that any and all
pragmatic defenses of faith are doomed, but only and more narrowly that William
James’ attempt to this effect is not in the final analysis compelling. Given
however that James’ effort may be viewed as representing one of the most
valiant of such efforts, this leaves us wondering whether and how a pragmatic
defense can be further improved.
REFERENCES
Alloy, L. B., &
Abramson, L. Y. “Judgment of Contingency in Depressed and Non- Depressed Students:
Sadder but Wiser?” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 108, (1979): 441-485.
----------- “Depressive Realism: Four Theoretical Perspectives.” In
L.Y. Abramson (Ed.), Cognitive processes in depression.
Goleman, Daniel. Vital Lies, Simple Truths: The Psychology
of Self-Deception.
Hudson, Yeager. The
Philosophy of Religion.
James, William. The
Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 1897. Reprinted in Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections
to the Doctrine,
---------- The Varieties of Religious Experience.
---------- Pragmatism.
---------- Writings:
1902-1910.
---------- “Is Life Worth Living?” International Journal of Ethics, October 1895. Reprinted in Robert
F. Davidson (Ed.), The Search for Meaning
in Life.
Taylor, Shelley &
Brown, J. D. “Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental
Health.” Psychological Bulletin, 103, (1988): 193-210.
Taylor, Shelley. Positive
Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind.
Tymoczko, Dmitri. “The Nitrous Oxide Philosopher.”